



Braunschweig

(gebombardeerd door LM658)



Colofon

“80 Jaar Vrijheid Bergentheim – Braunschweig”

Deze bundel is samengesteld ter gelegenheid van de tentoonstelling in 2025 met betrekking tot de geschiedenis van Bergentheim in en rondom de 2^e Wereldoorlog.

Deze bundel geeft toegevoegde informatie over Braunschweig, de stad die door de Lancaster van Bergentheim is gebombardeerd.

Gemaakt conform verzoek van de Oranjevereniging Bergentheim door de werkgroep “Tentoonstelling en Geschiedenis”. We hebben geprobeerd alle berichten van datering en bronvermelding te voorzien. De volgorde van alle berichten is zo goed mogelijk chronologisch weergegeven. De beoordeling of de inhoud in alle opzichten correct is, laten graag over aan de lezer.

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Op de 11 volgende pagina's is het SECRET aanvalsplan van de RAF op Braunschweig weergegeven.

De Lancaster van Bergentheim vloog in deze aanval mee...

C.-in-C.

SECRET

D/C-in-C.

S.A.S.O.

ENEMY RAID REACTION AND R.C.M. REPORT NO. 20.

NIGHT 12/13 AUGUST 1944.

<u>Target.</u>	<u>Sorties.</u>	<u>Losses.</u>	<u>T.O.T.</u>
Brunswick	379	27	0005-0018
Russelsheim	279	20	0015-0022
Falaise	144	-	0215-0221
Crossbow	50	-	2300-2322
Diversions	147	-	2255
(4955N.0030E).			

There was a very substantial reaction to the two main force raids on Germany but very little to anything else. The attacks on Crossbow targets were mentioned but no action was apparently taken and the diversion aroused no response.

Elements of at least seven twin-engined night-fighter Gruppen operated against the Brunswick raid and a further six were identified against the attack on Russelsheim. The single-engined fighters of JG 301, making their second sortie of the night, also attempted to intercept the bombers returning from the latter target. Despite the strength of the opposition and the number of control channels active it is remarkable that very few executive orders to fighters were intercepted. The controls which were heard were chiefly of the running commentary type, passing plots on the bomber stream. If this information is all that the fighters had to work on, then success could have been due only to skilful anticipation of the course of the raid in pre-flight briefing or to the possession of other means by which they are able to locate the bomber stream without specific directions from the ground.

Neither raid was plotted very early. Of the three routes into Brunswick, the first plots were on the more northerly one which made landfall east and the first concentration of plots developed in the area of south of EMDEN. I/NJG7 from MUNSTER and another unit, possibly I/NJG3 were ordered to beacon QUELLE (HAMBURG) shortly after the bombers had made landfall but apart from this there is no indication of the movements of the other units which were heard operating except that which can be deduced from the plots. These continued to the target and along the homeward routes to a point 50 miles off the Dutch Coast.

There were even fewer directions to fighters heard on the Russelsheim raid. Plotting began in the area south of Brussels and continued to the target and homewards as far as the Charleroi area. 1JG 301 were airborne in coastal areas at the time when the bombers were withdrawing.

There were twenty three different running commentary frequencies heard, eight of which were on HF R/T, two on VHF R/T, nine on H.F. W/T and four from MF W/T beacons. There was little activity from G.C.I but medium range fighters were operating on seven V.H.F. channels.

As many as possible of these controls were attacked with the appropriate countermeasures, more especially the H.F. running commentaries.

.../Against

PART I - DAY, 12th AUGUST.

AIR 14-3744

1. TARGETS AND SORTIES.

TARGET	GROUP	TYPE OF A/C	SORTIES	ATTACKED TARGET	MISSING	TIME OVER TARGET
i) BREST	5	L & M.	12	10	-	0945 - 0947
ii) FORET DE MONTRICHARD (4722N 0113E)	6, 8 (6) (8)	H & L. L & M.	117 (104) (13)	108 (99) (9)	-	1356 - 1404 (1400 - 1404) (1356 - 1404)
iii) LA PALlice	1, 8 (1) (8)	LANC. MOS.	24 (20) (4)	23 (19) (4)	-	1457 - 1505 (1500 - 1504) (1457 - 1505)
iv) BORDEAUX	1, 8 (1) (8)	LANC. LANC.	34 (30) (4)	32 (28) (4)	-	1507 - 1514 (1510 - 1514) (1507 - 1512)
v) BOMBER SUPPORT	100	MOS.	8	8	-	
vi) SPECIAL OPERATIONS	100	MOS.	1		-	
vii) MET. RECCE.	8	MOS.	3		-	
TOTAL			199	184	-	

2. APPRECIATION.

These operations were carried out in clear weather and without loss, although there was proof of the enemy's day fighters having attempted to intercept some of our bombers.

Spitfires escorting Halifaxes and Lancasters to the Foret de Montrichard (an oil target east of Tours) had combats with 10 FW.190's near Argentan, in which they claimed two destroyed without loss to themselves, and they engaged 6 Me.109's in the Tours area, when another E/A was shot down and one Spitfire lost. A further 15 Me.109's were seen by the escort, but none troubled the bombers. Their appearance on the scene coincided with the increased concern of the G.A.F. to protect the Wehrmacht in the N. France "pocket" from the new threat in the south.

Mosquitoes of No. 100 Group gave long range cover for the attack on Bordeaux and this was uneventful.

The German's coastal and Naval defences put up accurate and intense Heavy Flak at Bordeaux, and considerable accurate H.F. at La Pallice, but at Brest the opposition was less than previously and only 4 a/c were hit. At the Foret de Montrichard the H.F. was very slight.

PART II - NIGHT 12th/13th AUGUST.

1. TARGETS AND SORTIES.

TARGET	GROUP	TYPE OF A/C	SORTIES	ATTACKED TARGET	MISSING	TIME OVER TARGET
i) BRUNSWICK	1, 3, 4, 5, 6 (1) (3) (4) (5) (6)	LANC. LANC. HAL. LANC. H & L.	379 (83) (66) (89) (72) (69)	350 (79) (59) (83) (64) (65)	27 (7.1%) (8) (3) (7) (4) (5)	2358 - 0028 (0002 - 0015) (0003 - 0014) (0006 - 0028) (2358 - 0012) (0006 - 0018)
ii) KIEL (SpooF)	8	MOS.	21	20	-	2331 - 2344
iii) RUSSEL SHELM (4959N 0823E)	1, 3, 4, 5, 8 (1) (3) (4) (5) (8)	LANC. LANC. HAL. LANC. L & M.	297 (9) (46) (96) (60) (86)	276 (8) (43) (96) (56) (79)	20 (6.7%) (1) (5) (7) (3) (4)L	0007 - 0027 (0014 - 0021) (0013 - 0022) (0019 - 0025) (0015 - 0027) (0007 - 0020)
iv) FRANKFURT (SpooF)	8	MOS.	10	10	1 (10%)	0008 - 0012

01214-3744

TARGET	GROUP	TYPE OF A/C	SORTIES	ATTACKED TARGET	MISSING	TIME OVER TARGET
v) LA NEUVILLE (4950N 0138E)	6, 8 (6) (8)	HAL. MOS.	25 (20) (5)	24 (19) (5)	-	2255 - 2304 (2300 - 2304) (2255 - 2259)
vi) LA BRETEQUE (4930N 0105E)	6, 8 (6) (8)	HAL. MOS.	25 (20) (5)	23 (19) (4)	-	2316 - 2324 (2321 - 2324) (2316 - 2319)
vii) FALAISE (4854N 0013W)	1, 3, 5, 6, 8 (1) (3) (5) (6) (8)	LANC. S & L. LANC. H & L. L & M.	144 (33) (22) (25) (48) (16)	138 (32) (22) (25) (44) (15)	-	0207 - 0227 (0215 - 0227) (0214 - 0225) (0217 - 0226) (0215 - 0222) (0207 - 0219)
viii) JUVINCOURT A/F	8	MOS.	3	1	-	0140
ix) COULOMMIERS A/F	8	MOS.	3	2	-	0139 - 0149
x) TROSSY	8	MOS.	2	1	-	0029
xi) MINELAYING	3, 5, 6 (3) (5) (6)	LANC. LANC. HAL.	14 (6) (4) (4)	14 (6) (4) (4)	-	2330 - 0250 (0214 - 0250) (0110 - 0130) (2330 - 2331)
xii) BOMBER SUPPORT	100	L, S, F,	58	54	1 (1.7%)	
xiii) DIVERSIONARY SWEEP	VARIOUS (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (91) (92) (93) (100)	HAL. STIR. HAL. S & L. H & L. WELL. WELL. WELL. FORT.	160 (14) (2) (19) (32) (17) (13) (30) (31) (2)	153 (14) (2) (18) (29) (15) (13) (29) (31) (2)	-	
(xiv) SPECIAL OPERATIONS	100	VARIOUS	17		-	
xv) MET. RECCE.	8	MOS.	2	2	-	
xvi) LEAFLETS	93	WELL.	21	18	-	0044 - 0133
T O T A L			1,181	1,086	49 (4.2%)	

*4 HAL. 1 LANC.

2. APPRECIATION.

This night was the first this summer in which the hours of darkness made possible penetration by heavy bombers into Central Germany. With a raid on Brunswick, carried out solely by instruments, was coupled an attack in the south on Russelsheim, which lies between Mainz and Frankfurt and in their defence zone.

The intention was for the two forces to reach the Continent simultaneously, just after 2300 hrs, their approaches having been screened by Mandrel jamming since 2130 hrs., and at the same time to try to draw a few Gruppen of fighters towards the Dieppe area by means of two small Crossbow attacks, bolstered in numbers by a diversionary sweep of 150 a/c which would follow them closely across the Channel. A Mosquito spoof raid on Kiel was to add to the enemy's difficulties in the north, and a visit to Frankfurt had a similar purpose in the south.

Although the enemy adequately allotted his fighters to the two main raids he did not handle at all well those he had already moved from Holland and Belgium to cover North Germany, insofar as he failed to shoot down more than a few bombers before reaching their target at Brunswick. The Mandrel screen and the splitting of the force into three parts which crossed the Dutch and German coasts at wide intervals (see route map) helped to confound him. Some fighters were early directed to the Elbe across and away from our bombers' track, and his control was badly mistaken in guessing from the early plots that Bremen (90 miles from Brunswick) was the target.

The first wave, comprising No. 5 Group, met no trouble until well after leaving target, a second wave of Nos 1 and 3 Groups was able to cross M. Holland and skirt Hannover with very little opposition, and it was only when the last wave, of Nos. 4 and 6 Groups, left target that the losses really began. Our a/c, assisted by a strong W wind, had then been only 1½ hrs over enemy territory, and they tried to lessen the effects of the wind on leaving target by losing height in stages that differed as between the various Groups. After the first 50 miles the first two waves turned westwards, to split again west and north-west when past Bremen. The third wave headed straight NW from target to the mouth of the Weser.

These tactics almost certainly kept the opposition down, but even so the arrival of fighters could not be longer delayed. Wherever they were when the Bremen mistake was rectified, they would have little difficulty in intercepting the stream of bombers that must have been heading in their direction, and against the wind. The absence of the moon helped the bombers, but even so the bombing, followed by plentiful tracer from the first combats, helped the fighters to make contact.

It appears that half the losses were caused along the first 100 miles of the homeward journeys. The other half were due to scattered incidents. The first and second waves were hotly engaged on their westerly leg, where, too, flak pitfalls lay in wait for any a/c off track owing to the strong wind. The last wave was caught up on the leg from target and, though the losses on different waves and different routes were not greatly at variance, the evidence of combat positions suggests that No. 4 Group, by losing height to 4,000 ft after leaving target, escaped rather more of the opposition than did No. 6 Group, who descended much nearer the coast. This wave was followed out to sea by German fighters.

There appears to have been a flak ceiling of 19-20,000 ft at Brunswick, for the benefit of fighters. Only one loss occurred here, but other losses due to flak were reported at the southernmost turning point, at Oldenburg, SE of Bremen, in the area well north of Hanover, at Wesermunde, from a ship off Norddeich, at Leeuwarden and at Amland - a total of eight lost to flak, some of which were coded in S/Ls. Fighters were reported to have shot down one near Minden, one at target, 4 on the leg after target, 4 on the first westerly leg, and five at isolated points further along the three homeward routes. This suggests 15 were shot down by fighters and eight by flak.

The raid on Russelsheim cannot be analysed as fully as one would wish because the movements of fighters from Belgium, N. France and SW Germany are only sketchily known. Few course directions were given them - perhaps because St. Trond and Floronnes were almost on track. The main incidents were spread over the journey from the Brussels area to target and back. It was natural that Frankfurt or Mannheim should be taken as the target, as both were in easy reach of Russelsheim.

Many S/Ls exposed there, mainly for the benefit of fighters. Flak seems to have caused losses at Louvain, at the target, along the Upper Rhine, near Julich and at Chievres, and fighters are reported to have shot down one south of Liege and one at Trier (outward), two at the target, and eight along the homeward route as far as south of Ghent. The totals are 12 to fighters, 5 to flak.

Little of note occurred on the French missions or the diversion, and no losses were involved. They attracted the attention of S/E fighters only, as far as is known.

The attack on the enemy in and around Falaise, which was ordered, planned and carried out within a very short time to assist the Allied forces in Normandy, met practically no opposition.

Causes of loss as stated above, were :-

27 to fighters; 13 to flak; 9 to unknown causes.

3. ROUTES AND TIMING ORDERED.

Brunswick : i) Northerly route, 3rd wave, Nos. 4 & 6 Groups.

5355N 0430E - 5410N 0650E - 5300N 0800E - 5200N 0920E - Brunswick -
5219N 1043E - 5400N 0800E - 5350N 0500E.

ii) Central route, 1st wave, No. 5 Group.

5335N 0430E - 5340N 0620E - 5300N 0700E - 5300N 0800E - 5200N 0920E -
Brunswick - 5219N 1043E - 5250N 1000E - 5250N 0810E - 5350N 0710E -
5345N 0500E.

iii) Southerly route, 2nd wave, Nos. 1 and 3 Groups.

5315N 0400E - 5318N 0505E - 5240N 0700E - 5240N 0800E - 5200N 0920E -
Brunswick - 5219N 1043E - 5250N 1060E - 5250N 0700E - 5335N 0500E.

T.O.T. 0005 - 0018 hrs. Over Continent 2308 - 0154 hrs.

Kiel : 5440N 0700E - 5440N 1000E - Kiel - 5430N 0820E - 5335N 0430E -
Coltishall.
T.O.T. 2334 - 2336 hrs. Over Continent 2317 - 2351 hrs.

Russelsheim : 5140N 0300E - 5045N 0340E - 5040N 0505E - 4940N 0700E - Russelsheim -
4945N 0815E - 4940N 0640E - 5035N 0510E - 5030N 0345E - 5140N 0300E -
(Mosquitoes returned as from Frankfurt).
T.O.T. 0009 - 0022 hrs. Over Continent 2303 - 0239 hrs.

Frankfurt : Outward as Russelsheim, then - Frankfurt - 5020N 0830E - 5010N 0620E -
5120N 0530E.
T.O.T. 0005 - 0009 hrs. Over Continent 2308 - 0106 hrs.

La Neuville : 5125N 0045W - 5030N 0015W - 4950N 0040E - La Neuville - 4950N 0143E -
4954N 0143E - 5030N 0015W - 5125N 0045W.
T.O.T. 2256 - 2306 hrs. Over France 2227 - 2305 hrs.

La Breteque : 5125N 0110W - 4950N 0030W - La Breteque - 4929N 0110E - 4933N 0112E -
4950N 0030W - 5125N 0110W.
T.O.T. 2316 - 2322 hrs. Over France 2244 - 2328 hrs.

Falaise : Selsey Bill - 4925N 0100W - Falaise - Reading.
T.O.T. 0208 - 0221 hrs. Over France 0142 - 0230 hrs.

Diversionsary: 5125N 0045W - 5030N 0015W - 4955N 0030E - 5000N 0020W - Reading.
Sweep Time at 4955N 0030E - 2255 hrs.

Mandrel Screen : 2130 - 0150 hrs.

See route map on back of page 5.

4. WEATHER.

Moon : Less than half, rising about 0145 hrs.

Brunswick : 8-10/10ths layer cloud at about 10,000 ft. Wind at 20,000 ft, 260 degs,
50 m.p.h. Route: Cloud sheets in thin layers, with gaps, but dense in
places.

Russelsheim: Little cloud. Very haze. Wind at 20,000 ft, 260 degs, 45 m.p.h.
Route : As for Brunswick.

Crossbow : 9/10ths A-cu., base 22,000 ft, clear below. Wind at 10,000 ft, 270
degts degs, 25 m.p.h.

Falaise : A broken layer of thin Sc or haze.

Bases & Enemy A/Fs : Fit.

5. ENEMY FIGHTER REACTION.

Brunswick : 2303 hrs, Benito a/c heard - one going to the Stade area. 2313
I NJG 3 (Vechta) sent to the Stade area and were given plots on the bombers crossing
the N. German coast. 2319, I NJG 7 (Munster) sent at top speed to the same area.
2340, "Bremen" was said to be the target. 2349, Fighters were sent to a G.C.I.
position east of Hanover. 0010, Brunswick was correctly identified as the target.
Plots on the southerly return route followed the bombers nearly to Zwolle. 0118,
Landing orders began, Plantlume, Nordholz, Wittmundhafen, Gutersloh, Leenwarden,
Deelen, Volkel and Twente being mentioned. The spoof on Kiel was plotted.

Russelsheim : 2227 hrs, 4 JD forward control was heard. 2246-8, I NJG 4 was
sent to the Cambrai area, with Chievres as an alternative. 2308, Allied a/c were
reported west of Chievres. 2316, IV NJG 1 (St. Trond) were airborne and sent on a
course of 120 degs. 2345, I NJG 4 given plots on bombers east of their base at
Florennes. 2348-0153, I NJG 5 (St. Dizier) were active. 2355, II NJG 6 (Stuttgart/
Gelterdingen) were given plots. 0018, Spearhead was reported NE of Saarbrücken.
0019, Target announced as Frankfurt and Mannheim. 0033, Frankfurt was still said to
be the centre of attack and many bombers were reported there. 0035, II NJG 6 were

the target was between Frankfurt and Mainz, and continued to receive plots till 0953. 0108, 110ts were given south and south-west of Liege.

French targets : 2210 hrs, 5 JD control was heard. 2252, 15 a/c were reported west of Dieppe flying SE. 2318, "Many a/c" were reported in the battle area but at 2320 hrs were said to have been lost.

6. ATTACKS AND COMBATS.

Brunswick : The 60 a/c in the first wave, on the central route, reported three combats (5%); the 127 a/c in the second wave, on the southerly route, 15 combats (12%); and the 136 a/c in the third wave, on the northerly route, 26 combats (20%). This discrepancy evidently was due to the differences in T.O.T. and not to the merits of separate routes.

On the outward route the first wave (No. 5 Group) reached target without a single combat, the second wave met only 2 U/I a/c near Hinder (2336-42 hrs), but the third wave were later (2353-0001 hrs) involved in five combats before reaching Hinder. At the target there were only one attack and two combats at 0006, 0009 and 0017 hrs (18-21,000 ft). There was then a combined NW log of 50 miles, along which most of the attacks occurred. The first wave had one combat at 0009 hrs, the second three combats, 0011-24 hrs, and the third wave light attacks and three combats 0016-0030 hrs. This wave continued NW to the coast near Wesermunde and had six more attacks and a combat (0023-0112 hrs). The first and second waves turned east to fly south of Bremen and the first wave, turning NW east of the Ems, had no more combats. The second wave had seven attacks on turning westward until south of Bremen 0018-0051 hrs. Further west there were no more attacks. One a/c that returned early fired on an E/A over the North Sea.

27 E/A were identified as T/E (9 JU.88's, 5 Me.110's, 4 He.410's), 7 as S/E and 11 were not identified.

Bomber claims were 10 E/A destroyed, 3 probables and 2 damaged.

A special duty Halifax claimed to have damaged one of three JU.88's that attacked in the Bremen-Wesermunde area while the Halifax was engaged by Heavy Flak.

Russelsheim : Outward - Only one attack and four combats in the last 140 miles to target. Over target, 0012-0026hrs - three attacks and seven combats. Scattered bombats and attacks occurred during the next hour, and south-east of Brussels, 0113-0123 hrs. five attacks were reported at from 7-13,000 ft. Two S/E E/A were fired on further west over Belgium. 18 E/A were described as T/E (3 Me.110's, 6 JU.88's and 2 Me.410's), 11 as S/E, and 2 were unidentified.

Bomber claims were : 2 E/A destroyed, 4 damaged.

Falaise : 1 Lanc was attacked at 8,000 ft, east of the target after flares had been dropped.

7. GROUND DEFENCES.

Brunswick (15-23,000ft) : H.F. moderate barrage over a fairly wide area, with some predicted fire. Fighters operating over ceiling of 19-20,000ft. S/Ls and many fighter flarea. **Route**: Little opposition on track, but defences of Ameland, Terschelling, Leeuwarden, Bremen, Hanover, Oldenburg, and Wesermunde were active.

Russelsheim (13-21,000ft) : H.F. barrage slight, over a wide area, and increasing in intensity. Many S/Ls, mainly for fighters.

Falaise (4-8,000ft) : Defences virtually nil.

8. ENEMY CLAIMS.

"Night fighters and A.A. artillery of the Luftwaffe shot down 58 terror bombers".

9. TYPES OF A/C AND BOMBING PARTICULARS.

To be issued as a supplement.

FOR MAP SEE OVER.



H.A.B.C.

AIR STAFF INTELLIGENCE.

EC/S.2737/Int.3.

Issued at 18.00 hrs 17th August 1944.

AIR 14 3412



BOMBER COMMAND REPORT ON NIGHT OPERATIONS

12/13th AUGUST, 1944.

BRUNSWICK: RUSSELSHEIM: L. NEUVILLE: L. BESEQUE: P.I. ISE: Kiel: Frankfurt;
Juvincourt: Coulommiers: Troyes: Minelaying: Diversionary Sweep: etc.

SUMMARY

1. Bomber Command made two attacks on this night, one, made entirely by the use of H2S, on Brunswick and the other on the Opel works at Russelsheim. Neither attack achieved a marked success, although a good concentration of bombing was produced at Russelsheim, unfortunately just off the small target. It would appear that the choice of Mainz rather than Darmstadt as the H2S fix for the G.P.I. run of the first markers at Russelsheim was not a good one, and the presence of thick ground haze made visual identification of the target by later markers impossible. Nevertheless, considerable damage was done to both targets. 47 aircraft were lost on these two raids, the bombers claiming to have destroyed 42 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed 3, and damaged 6 others. Attacks were also made on two flying bomb launching sites with some success, and without loss, while an attack on enemy ground forces in and around Falaise, which was ordered, planned and carried out within a very short period of time, achieved a great success also without loss. A large programme of patrols, diversions and attacks on enemy airfields was also carried out in support of the attacks on German targets. Mines were laid in enemy waters, and leaflets were dropped over towns in Central France.

WEATHER FORECAST

2. Bases:- Fit all night, with local obscuration towards dawn.

Routes and Targets:- Cloud in layers on route, generally thin with large gaps in between. Brunswick: 3-10/10ths clear at 10-12,000' and above 20,000' may affect Brunswick at midnight, but there will be little cloud below 10,000'. Russelsheim: good chance of clear skies. Neuville area: as Brunswick, but cloud should clear late in the night.

Moon:- Less than half moon rising about 0145 hrs.

PLANS OF ATTACK

3. Brunswick The attack on this target was to be made by aircraft equipped with H2S, and no markers of any sort were to be dropped. No aircraft of the Pathfinder Force was detailed to attack Brunswick, and it was hoped to establish the accuracy of Main Force bombing on H2S by means of this raid. Aircraft with H2S unserviceable were to continue to the target, however, and bomb on the estimated position of the target, or on fires seen in the target area, or by any other means possible. The force was divided into three waves, composed as follows:- 1st. Wave: 75 Lancasters of 5 Group, bombing from H to H+3. 2nd. Wave: 82 Lancasters of 1 Group (including 10 H.B.C. aircraft) plus 74 Lancasters of 3 Group; bombing from H+3 to H+6. 3rd. Wave: 93 Halifaxes of 4 Group, 21 Lancasters of 5 Group, and 48 Halifaxes of 6 Group; bombing from H+3 to H+13. H was at 0005 hrs. when the attack was timed to start, as there was no marker force, and it was planned to continue until 0018 hrs.

4. Russelsheim The small size of the target led to the choice of controlled visual groundmarking as the marking technique for this raid. Blind markers were used to provide illumination and for emergency marking only. The attack was to be opened at H-10 by 4 Mosquito window openers. At H-6 to H-5 the target was to be illuminated by 15 Blind illuminators carrying Green T.I.and hooded flares.

divided between them. Flak was negligible, and although two fighters were sighted, neither opened fire, one was fired on by a Halifax, but no claim was made. No aircraft was lost on either of these operations.

13. Falaise A very good concentration of tanks was achieved by the Mosquitos, which was estimated by the Master Bomber to be slightly to the east of the aiming point. He ordered the Main Force to bomb the most westerly of the red T.I., but subsequently saw it to be about 200 yds. to the south of the red so he dropped his green T.I. on the estimated position of the aiming point, and instructed the Main Force to bomb green T.I. from 0216 hours. These green were accurately backed up later on. Bombing was reported extremely well concentrated, and at least six large red explosions were seen in the target area. Very slight light flak was encountered, only one fighter was seen, which fired on a Lancaster of 6 Group without inflicting any damage. No aircraft was missing from this operation.

DAY RECONNAISSANCE

14. Brunswick Although photographs showed that the damage from the attack of 12/13th August was scattered through the town, without any heavy concentrations in any particular area, a number of priority industrial targets had been hit. The Neupetril branch of the Mühlenbau Industrie A.G. engaged in producing airframe components, had had two of the major buildings now damaged severely. The M.I.A.G. plant in the Wilhelmstr. district, producing Me.110 components, and the adjoining heavy engineering works, Wilke-Werke A.G., also showed fresh damage. The adjacent factory Bussing M.A.G. previously damaged, showed additional damage, and an unidentified industrial site adjoining it had suffered heavily. The South Marshalling yard had been hit, several tracks having been cut, and rolling stock destroyed. The main passenger station had also been hit again, two more covered platforms being severely damaged. The town power station and the previously damaged gas works in the Wilhelmstr. district had both received hits. Scattered incidents of business or residential damage could be seen throughout the town area, especially in the residential district North and West of Prinz Albrecht Park.

15. Russelsheim Damage shown by the photographs appeared to be mostly in the S.W. area of the target, although considerable destruction had been done in housing situated to the S.E. of the target, in a village 3 miles away had been partially devastated. Fires were still burning in the woods in the neighbourhood of the village. In the Opel works themselves, the loading and despatch hall had suffered most severely, one of three buildings, two reconstructed bays, and the remaining portion of the main halls being gutted. Parts of the multi-storey building used for gear-grinding had also been damaged by high explosive and fire, and one store had been destroyed. Stores kept in the open had been damaged and an unidentified building had also received damage from fire.

16. La Neuville: La Breteque Fresh craters were to be seen in the target area, and in fields to the west of La Neuville, but heavy shadows from trees obscured the buildings on the site, and it proved impossible to see whether they had been hit. At La Breteque there were at least three craters in the target area, but no damage to the launching point was visible. The north-south road had been cut in at least two places.

17. Falaise This attack could be seen from the photographs to have been highly successful. The main high road leading southwest towards Brionne and Flers had been cut in 9 places by at least 14 craters. Almost every street in Falaise itself was blocked by craters or rubble, some sections of the town being devastated. Small secondary roads in the east and southwest areas had been hit many times. The largest group of craters visible was immediately around and to the west of the pin-point. Other smaller groups were scattered within the target area. Almost no motor transport was to be seen.

...../ENEMY DEFENCES.

ENEMY DEFENCES

18. Kriemhild attacking Brun already over t outward route, their way out, before reaching the target. the N.W. leg waves. The to fly east of Bremen had to a position northwesterly combat. At third 26. strong west after reaching contact with rectified, t combats. F homeguard rocket fighters were given of St. Tron were in act attacks on encountered Moderate b ceiling of was brought Terschelli and account barrage ov On route t and Chiev any of the

CASUALTIES

19. T would app the direr of the re at isolat this forc point of and at W Nordernay fighters Russelsh Liege, o the home occurred Chievres No airc the Bru receive several this fo aircraf minor d aircraf other t suffer

-2-

TOP SECRET


against the H.F. R/T Corona was used on seven frequencies, Jostle on six Special Tinsel on seven. The jamming frequently had the effect of closing the channel affected but only for the plotting to reappear on a different frequency or, as happened on one instance, on the same frequency again after jammers had been switched. Ten Drumstick transmitters were used against H.F. W/T and Fidget against the MF W/T. It may be assumed that since these transmissions were not controlling separate bodies of fighters but passing running commentaries for the benefit of all, that the large jammer used was necessary on account of the pressure of the jamming.

A.B.C. aircraft were flying on both raids and Ground Cigar was in operation from 2317 until 0350.

The Mandrel Screen operated over a front of about two hundred miles over the North Sea and it is noteworthy that the only track to be plotted before crossing over into enemy territory was the most northerly one which would have given the least protection; this is in itself not positive evidence that bombers were not seen sooner.

Air Commodore,
Chief Signals Officer.

Aug. 1944.



GPS NR 7PS 10 J 1-1

FROM IN 5 GROUP 141310A
 TO ALL BASES AND STATIONS, FISHERTON

NEW HODG
 SECRET 00X
 FORM B MC 42
 14TH OCTOBER 1944

5 GROUP

(C) 220+ A/C OF 5 GRP WILL ATTACK THE TARGET. IN ADDITION 1,000
 A/C OF 1 3 4 AND 5 GROUPS WILL ATTACK C O D AT 2959 HOURS
 AND AT 0140 HOURS
 0325 0129

(D) TO COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF AN ENEMY INDUSTRIAL CENTRE

(E) NIGHT 14TH/15TH OCTOBER 1944

BRUNSWICK

(F) 53 BASE - 80+

57 BASE - 100+

49 SQDN - 18+

54 BASE - 13+(106 SQDN) PLUS FLARE AND MARKER FORCES

(G) S K A T E

(I) NORMAL

(J) NORMAL

(K) BASE - READING (A) - DEACRY HEAD (B) - 5013 N 0133 E (C)
 - 5005 N 0330 E (D) - 5030 N 0720 E (E) - 5144 N 0845 E (F)
 TARGET

(L) TARGET - 5210 N 1040 E (G) - 5135 N 0900 E (H) - 5030 N
 0720 E (I) - 5000 N 0500 E (J) - 5120 N 0200 E (K) - BASE

(M) (1) H HOUR IS PROVISIONALLY 0400 HOURS 0230.

(2) T.O.T. H TO H + 6 (2 X 3 MIN WAVES)

(3) A/C ARE TO BE SPREAD EVENLY OVER THE T.O.T. BUT A/C
 WITH THE LONGER DELAYS ARE TO ATTACK IN THE FIRST WAVE

(N) (1) PETROL 1650 GALLONS

(2) BOMB LOAD AND FUSING

51 A/C : 1 X 2000 MC PLUS MAX 'J' CLUSTERS

REMAINDER : 1 X 1000 MC/CP FUSED NOSE INST. PLUS MAX

4 LB INC BOMBS, PREFERABLY IN 8 GLC'S OTHERWISE CLUSTERS

(3) STACK SPACING IS 30 YARDS

(4) WINDOW IS TO BE DROPPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 GP O.I. 33.

(5) RB PHOTOGRAPHY: ALL A/C ARE TO CARRY NIGHT CAMERA AND
 FLASHES FUSED TO EXPLODE AT POINT 6 OF A/C HEIGHT



2024:



Op 13 augustus 1944 wierp de Lancaster van Bergentheim z'n bommen af op Braunschweig. Die nacht kwamen er 38 mensen om.

Enige tijd later, 15 oktober 1944, werd Braunschweig opnieuw gebombardeerd. Toen ontstond er een grote vuurstorm waardoor velen verstikten. Dit nacht stierven 98 inwoners en staat in Braunschweig bekend als het grote bombardement.





Dem schweren Terrorangriff auf die Stadt Braunschweig in der Nacht zum 15. Oktober fielen zum Opfer:


Ahlers, Agnes	Fritsch, Robert	Köcherthal, Ella	Kriegel, Anna
Ahlers, Ursula	Fröling, Elisabeth	Kückshahn, Hilde	Kisch, Clara
Ahrens, Alfred	Gebbert, Fritz	Kunze, Hermann	Koloff, Hans
Ahrens, Ernst	Gebke, Bernd	Kurthart, Martha	Koloff, Ingeborg
Antkowiak, Günther	Gerner, Gustav	Kurthart, Willi	Koloff, Hans-Eckart
August, Wilhelm	Glas, Mathilde	Kühner, Anna	Kosenthal, Erika
Badstuber, Meta	Glas, Walter	Kühner, Ingeborg	Kothbach, Edward
Baumgärtner, Gertraud	Glas, Hermann	Kühner, Julius	Kuba, Kurt
Baumgarten, Hermann	Glas, Marie	Kühner, Karl	Kühner, Wilhelm
Bausch, Otto	Göbel, Ferdinand	Kühner, Marie	Scheller, Adolf
Bausch, Erna	Göbel, Gertraud	Kühner, Otto	Scheller, Wolfgang
Bausch, Wilhelm	Göbel, Henry	Kühner, Auguste	Schilling, Minna
Beck, Annemarie	Göbel, Elviede	Kühner, Annemarie	Schilling, Paul
Becker, Christoph	Grasch, Albin	Kühner, Helmut	Schilling, Auguste
Beckers, Paula	Grapp, Fritz	Kühner, Johannes	Schmidt, Arthur
Behrens, Helmut	Grapp, Horst	Kühner, Auguste	Schmidt, Bruno
Berg, Meta	Grotzke, Heinrich	Kühner, Erich	Schmidt, Hans-Johann
Bertram, Berle	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Mathilde	Schmidt, Clara
Bewig, Adolf	Grunwald, Emma	Kühner, Paul	Schmidt, Lisa
Beyer, Franz	Grotzke, Fritz	Kühner, Elise	Schmidt, Helene
Bienkenburg, Margarete	Grotzke, Hermann	Kühner, Ingeborg	Schmidt, Ingeborg
Blakenburg, Hans-Henry	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Erich	Schmidt, Alfred
Blakmann, Ferdinand	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Ludwig	Schulder, Otto
Bock, Berle	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Hermann	Schulder, Reinhard
Bock, Paul	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Walter	Schulder, Heinrich
Böhm, Auguste	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Ingeborg	Schulder, Gertraud
Böhm, Fritz	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Johanna	Schulder, Johann
Böhm, Wilma	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Anna	Schulder, Emma
Borchers, Erna	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Ruth	Schulder, Heinrich
Borchers, Joachim	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, August	Serber, Anna
Borkenhagen, Gertraud	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Hermann	Seydath, Harald
Borkowski, Erwin	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, August	Siemann, Anna
Borkowski, Franz	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Maß, Helene	Siemann, Walter
Bornemann, Hedwig	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Otto	Siverson, Theodor
Boss, Heinrich	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Ingeborg	Solbrig, Karl
Böth, Emil	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Robert	Soldner, Hans
Böthje, Robert	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Gerta	Steffen, Marianna
Böthje, Karl	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Styring, Hermann
Brand, Hilda	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Liselotte	Speeth, Helene
Brandt, Eduard	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Ottilie	Speeth, Peter
Brandt, Elise	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Anneliese	Speeth, Wolfgang
Brandt, Otto	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Alfred	Spier, Dora
Breller, Max	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Erika	Stäger, Hans-Georg
Brustle, Auguste	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Richard	Stadewald, Hedwig
Buchholtz, Marie	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Adèle	Stück, Karl
Buchholz, Fritz	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Otto	Tappes, Martha
Buchholz, Marie	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Marie	Teller, Emma
Burgdorf, Karl	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Hans-Dieter	Thiele, Emilie
Collet, Josef	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Ingeborg	Tiefenbach, Helene
Corvelius, Friederike	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Timp, Dorothea
De Looze, Martha	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Treite, Fritz
De Looze, Helene	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Typel, Karl
De Looze, Hermann	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Uetzel, Elvira
De Looze, Pauline	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Versteeg, Viktoria-Luise
Dreier, Maria	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Vierlich, Reinhold
Drewe, Hensel	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	de Vries, Adolf
Dünhaupt, Walter	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	de Vries, Auguste
Ebers, Karl-Fritz	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	de Vries, Delfid
Ebeling, Martha	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	de Vries, Werner
Van den Eden, Edward	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wackernagel, Richard
Eisenberger, Wilhelm	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wichter, Helene
Eilers, Minna	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wichter, Rudolf
Ehrlich, Meta	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wardenburg, Margot
Ehrlich, Ursula	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Warnecke, Johanne
Ehrlich, Herbert	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Warnecke, Katharina
Ehrlich, Willi	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Weber, Sonja
Eggel, Franz	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wecke, Hedwig
Erbert, Berta	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wegmann, Nabille
Ert, Elise	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wellner, Hildegard
Ert, Norbert	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wille, Karl
Falkenberg, Elli	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	van der Werf, Friedrich
Fenne, Käthe	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Westrich, Wilhelm
Finner, Wilhelm	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wiesmann, Anna
Fischer, Erich	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wiesmann, Wilhelm
Fischer, Irma	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wingmann, Wilhelm
Feuerhahn, Dieter	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Winn, Paul
Feuerhahn, Erna	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wipperfurth, Berle
Fels, Otto	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Witt, Adolf
Fester, Arthur	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Witt, Ottilie
Frenzel, Hans	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Wolawa, Julia
Frenzel, Margarete	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Zech, Marie
Frick, Marie	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Zech, Uwe
Frick, Robert	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Ziegenberg, Emilie
Frick, Ingeborg	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	Ziegenberg, Friedrich
Fridolf, Elise	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	
Fritsch, Martha	Grotzke, Milla	Kühner, Karl-Erhard	

Sie sind — ebenso wie die Volksgenossen, deren Identifizierung nicht möglich ist — im Freiheitskampf ihres Volkes gefallen für den Sieg und damit für die Größe unseres Reiches. Ihr Opfer ist ihr Vermächtnis, das wir Lebenden zu erfüllen haben. Die ganze Liebe und Betreuung der nationalsozialistischen Volksgemeinschaft gehört den Hinterbliebenen unserer Toten. Wir werden die Gefallenen niemals vergessen.

LAUTERBACHER, Gauleiter

für die Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei und Volksgemeinschaft
des Gaues Südhannover-Braunschweig.





Na elk bombardement moesten de burgers van Braunschweig die schade hadden, dit aangeven:

Merkblatt für Fliegergeschädigte

Volksgenossen und Volksgenossinnen!

Die Volksgenossen des Aufnahmekreises heißen Euch herzlich willkommen. Sie haben in voller Würdigung Eures schweren Geschickes sich gerne bereit erklärt, Euch in ihren Häusern und Wohnungen gastfreundlich aufzunehmen.

So hart Euer durchlebtes Schicksal auch ist, so bitten wir Euch, folgendes zu berücksichtigen und Euer Verhalten im Gastkreis danach auszurichten:

1. Ihr kommt aus dem Luftkriegsgebiet und habt dort eine vorbildliche Haltung gezeigt. Seid auch in Eurem Gastkreis tapfer und treu und helft mit Eurer Zuversicht, die innere Front der mutigen Herzen aufrecht zu erhalten.
2. Hütet Euch vor Uebertreibungen, denn die Erfahrung lehrt, daß Ihr damit der wilden Gerüchsbildung Tor und Tür öffnet und unnötig zahlreichen Volksgenossen das Herz schwer macht, die ihre Kraft und Zuversicht dringend für ihre Arbeit benötigen, die auch für Euch und Eure Angehörigen geleistet wird.
3. Verlangt nicht besondere Vorteile, die anderen Volksgenossen nicht zustehen. Zeigt Euch korrekt in allen Pflichten der kriegswirtschaftlichen Ordnung und beweist auch dadurch das Soldatentum, das Ihr durch Euren mutigen Einsatz in Eurer Heimat vorgelebt habt.
4. Achtet Eigenheiten Eurer Gastgeber. Sie sind vielfach an andere Verhältnisse gewöhnt, als sie bei Euch zu Hause üblich sind. Klagen über fremde Bedingungen der neuen Umgebung führen zu Spannungen mit den Quartierleuten, die bei gutem Willen zu vermeiden sind.
5. Alle unsere Volksgenossen sind heute durch die vermehrten Leistungspflichten für den Kampf der Front und die Ernährung der Heimat in überreichem Maße in Anspruch genommen. Laßt Euch deshalb nicht bedienen, sondern helft Euch in allen Dingen Eurer Lebens- und Wohnungsordnung selbst. Denkt auch daran, daß Eure Gastgeber in allen Haushaltsgegenständen überaus beschränkt sind. Deshalb geht mit den Gegenständen, die Euch Eure Gastgeber zur Verfügung stellen, sorgsam um und bringt selbst Haushaltsgegenstände, die täglich gebraucht werden, soweit solche noch in Eurem Besitz sind, mit.
6. Versucht, soweit Ihr nicht einer eigenen beruflichen Tätigkeit nachgeht, zu helfen und Euch nützlich zu machen, wo Ihr könnt. Dadurch nützt Ihr Euch selbst am meisten, denn nur ein aus-gefülltes Dasein befriedigt und hilft Euch über alles Schicksal hinweg, das aus dem Schicksal der vergangenen Wochen und Monate Euer Denken und Sorgen erfüllt.
7. Wenn Ihr Euch in berechtigten Forderungen benachteiligt fühlt, wendet Euch an die Hoheitsträger der Partei. Sie sind die Vollstrecker der Gemeinschaftshilfe, die Euch in Eurer Not zuteil wird. Sie werden alle begründeten Beschwerden abstellen, so gut es unter den gegebenen Verhältnissen möglich ist.
8. Vergeßt nie, daß Ihr zur großen Front der Kämpfer um eine bessere Zukunft unseres deutschen Volkes gehört.

Das Bild Eurer Haltung ist mitbestimmend für den Sieg!

Schadensfall 15.10.44

Original

Emma
(Vor- und Zuname)

geb. am

in: *Leimen*

Kinder im Alter von

Jahren

Staatsangehörigkeit:

deutsch
Pörsch 9
(Bisherige Anschrift)

8
(Vorläufige Unterkunft)

(Beruf)

(Arbeitgeber)

Pörsch 9
(Anschrift des Arbeitgebers)

ist fliegergesch. - Totalschaden - Teilschaden - Personenschaden

und wird evakuiert nach:
verbleibt am Ort.

Der Geschädigte ist ausgewiesen durch:

vermißte Angehörige:

Bruch, den *17.10* 1943

Feldenheller


(Auffangsammelstelle)

Gahn

(Unterschrift)



Kaart van de omgeving van Braunschweig, in najaar 1944



Bron: website gemeentehuis Braunschweig

De geallieerde bommenwerpers wierpen ook folders uit die de Duitse bevolking duidelijk moesten maken waarom er gebombardeerd werd:



ADOLF HITLER ERKLÄRTE KRIEG
AN DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN

AM 11. DEZEMBER 1941

**Die amerikanische Flugwaffe
gibt die Antwort:**

ANGRIFF

**...Zusammen mit der RAF
bei Tag und bei Nacht**

**...Auf kriegswichtige Ziele
in allen Teilen des Reiches**

DIESES FLUGBLATT WURDE VON EINEM AMERIKANISCHEN BOMBER ABGEWORFEN





Braunschweigs
Altstadt wurde am
15. Oktober 1944
ein Opfer des
Krieges
Friedliche Arbeit
schuf von
1953-1955
neue Wohnstätten
im Schutze von
St. Andreas



WEICHBILD

NEUSTADT

Protokoll.

12. April 1945 2.59 Uhr.

Übergabeverhandlung der Stadt Braunschweig an die amerikanische Wehrmacht am 12. April 1945 2.59 Uhr:

Die Stadt Braunschweig wurde vertreten bei dieser Verhandlung durch ihren kommissarischen Oberbürgermeister Dr. jur Erich Bockler, wohnhaft Braunschweig, Helmstedter Straße 167 unter Hinzuziehen des stellvertretenden Polizeipräsidenten, Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei auf Widerruf Carl Stahl, wohnhaft Braunschweig, Sandweg 9. Es waren ferner anwesend als Zeugen der Polizeiangehörige Bruno Stövesandt, wohnhaft Braunschweig, Polizeibunker, und des Verkaufsleiters Walter Dietrich, wohnhaft in Braunschweig, Cheruskerstraße 57. als Bürger der Stadt Braunschweig.

Die amerikanische Wehrmacht wurde vertreten/Leutnant Jerome Burkott und Pfc. (Feldwebel) Rex. Mabry.
Protokollführer: Alfred Achilles, Braunschweig, Leonhardstraße

33. Der Bevollmächtigte der amerikanischen Wehrmacht begehrte die Übergabe der Stadt Braunschweig an die amerikanische Wehrmacht, das Einstellen der Feindseligkeiten und ordnungsgemäße Unterbringung der amerikanischen Soldaten und fragte den kommissarischen Oberbürgermeister, ob die Stadt dazu bereit wäre.

Der kommissarische Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Braunschweig gab daraufhin folgende Erklärung ab:


Die Stadt Braunschweig wurde bis heute nachmittag 16 Uhr vertreten durch den Bürgermeister Mertens. Dieser gehört der W an. Er hat sich etwa 16.30 Uhr in seinem Dienstzimmer im Rathaus erschossen, nachdem er zuvor den hier anwesenden Hauptmann Stahl für den Ordnerdienst, also zum stellvertretenden Polizeipräsidenten der Stadt Braunschweig, bestellt hatte. Die Kampfhandlungen um Braunschweig werden nicht von der Stadt oder dem Staatsministerium geleitet, sondern von dem Kampfkommandanten, einem General. Entscheidend beeinflusst werden die militärischen Maßnahmen durch den hiesigen Kreisleiter der NSDAP. Von dieser Seite aus sollte Braunschweig Haus für Haus verteidigt werden. Dagegen wandte ich mich, da mir bekannt geworden war, daß nicht nur die Wehrmacht, sondern auch die Truppenpolizei aus Braunschweig abgerückt war, und ein weiteres Kämpfen sinnlos und aussichtslos war. Aus eigener Initiative trat ich daher heute nachmittag an den stellvertretenden Polizeipräsidenten, Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei Stahl heran und ersuchte ihn, im Interesse der Bürger Braunschweigs weitere Zerstörungen zu unterbinden und diesbezüglich mit dem Kampfkommandanten zu verhandeln. Hauptmann Stahl bat mich die Verhandlungen mit dem Kampfkommandanten als seinen Bevollmächtigten zu führen und hat mich dort telefonisch angemeldet. Um 18 Uhr fanden bei dem Kampfkommandanten unter Zuziehen von Offizieren der Wehrmacht, des hiesigen Kreisleiters (Heilig), des Ministerpräsidenten Klagges, des Staatsrats Bertram mit mir eine eingehende Verhandlung bezüglich des Fortsetzens des Kampfes in und um Braunschweig statt. Es wurde auch hierbei die Frage der kommissarischen Besetzung des Postens des Oberbürgermeisters besprochen und hierfür einer der bisherigen Stadträte auserwählt. Zur Erörterung der der Stadt Braunschweig betreffenden weiteren Fragen wurde eine Besprechung um 20 Uhr im Kreisbefehlsstand anberaumt, zu der Beamte der Stadtverwaltung, der stellvertretende Polizeipräsident, Ministerpräsident Klagges und ich eingeladen waren. In dieser Versammlung erklärte Ministerpräsident/


Capitulatie van Braunschweig, 12 april 1945



“Wij kinderen beschouwden de dagelijkse waanzin van die jaren als gewoon normaal leven.”

Eckhard Schimpf heeft zijn boek uit 1997 “’s Nachts, wanneer de kerstbomen kwamen” herzien. Deze beschrijvingen van de oorlog en de naoorlogse periode tussen 1943 en 1948 hebben veel weerklank gevonden. Niet alleen onder de mensen die dit tijdperk hebben meegemaakt, maar ook onder de jongere generatie.





ECKHARD SCHIMPF,
Kolumnist der „Braunschweiger Zeitung“ und Autor zahlreicher Bücher zur braunschweigischen Geschichte, hat sein 1997 erschienenes Buch „Nachts, als die Weihnachtsbäume kamen“ überarbeitet.

„Wir Kinder hielten den täglichen Irrsinn jener Jahre für das ganz normale Leben.“

Bei Schülerinnen und Schülern, Studentinnen und Studenten, denen heute das damalige Geschehen schier unglaublich erscheint.

Das Jahr 2015 und das damit verbundene Gedenken an „70 Jahre Kriegsende“ lenken die Aufmerksamkeit nun erneut auf diese Schreckenszeit. Eckhard Schimpf erzählt davon. Aus der Sicht eines Kindes.

Diese Schilderungen der Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit zwischen 1943 und 1948 haben viel Resonanz gefunden. Nicht nur bei den Menschen, die diese Epoche miterlebt haben. Sondern auch bei der jüngeren Generation.

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